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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
------0------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein the 
Plaintiffs sought an adjudication in regard to the respective 
powers of the Municipal Council and of the Mayor under the 
council-mayor optional form of municipal government. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment holding 
that the mayor has only the powers specifically granted him by 
statute and that'all other powers, including the executive powers 
not specifically granted to the mayor, are vested in the munici-
pal council. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks an adjudication by this 
court that under the statutes of the State of Utah in a municipal 
government organized and established under the optional form 
known as the council-mayor form, all executive power is vested 
in the mayor and all legislative power in the municipal council. 
The appellant also seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling 
in regard to specific matters where such rulings are based on 
erroneous decisions as to the scope of the mayor's power. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As amicus curiae it would be improper to present a 
substantive statement of the facts surrounding this matter. 
However, a brief statement is offered to more precisely state 
the identity and interest of amicus. 
Amicus are members of the 42nd Legislature of the 
State of Utah. The Honorable Robert O. Bowen and Willard Hale 
Gardner are co-chairmen of the Joint Intergovernmental Relations 
Committee of the Legislature. The Honorable Karl N. Snow, Jr., 
was one of the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 179 (Chapter 33, 
Laws of Utah 1975) and Senate Bill No. 204 (Chapter 48, Part 12, 
Laws of Utah 1977), the subject legislation in this controversy. 
Amicus have no personal interest in the outcome of 
this matter, but are interested in it for two reasons: 
1. To see, if possible, that the legislative intent 
is presented to this Court for its consideration so that this 
intent may be carried out; or 
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2. If the subject legislation is not presently 
compatible with the legislature's intent, to obtain a judicial 
clarification of the legislation's failings so that they might 
be corrected in accord with this intent. 
I 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS THE 
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The individual functions of the legislature and the 
judiciary are, of course, well established and for the most 
part separate functions. Separate should not, however, neces-
sarily be construed to mean independent, for in large part, 
their functions are dependent on one another and, in fact, such 
interdependency is necessary for a full compliment of our laws. 
It is to that interdependency that this matter has now arrived. 
The legislature has endeavored to put its intent into statutory 
language, but a question has arisen about the meaning of its 
language. 
The Court, in its considerations, must determine the 
meaning of the statutes in question, but it is not without 
substantial judicial precedents for guidance in performing its 
task. This Court has often stated the rule of construction 
which it applies. In Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966), this Court stated: 
"The fundamental consideration which 
transcends all others in regard to the inter-
pretation and application of a.statute ~s: 
What was the intent of the legislature? 
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See also Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); 
Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d 756 (1951); 
Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766 (1951); and 
Taft v. Glade, 144 Utah 435, 201 P.2d 285 (1948). 
In determining the legislature's intent, there are 
certain factors that may justifiably be viewed by the Court 
for assistance along the way. While such factors are not 
necessarily dispositive of the issue at hand, they may be of 
great value in interpreting intent. In that regard, this Court 
in Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972) 
recently stated: 
•. if there is any doubt or uncer-
tainty as to such (legislation), its origin, 
history and pu~pose can be examined to 
determine its correct interpretation and 
application." 
See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 
340, 130 P.2d 663 (1942). 
Information regarding such fundamental aspects of the 
subject legislation is sparce at the lower court level and 
amicus respectfully submits that such information should be 
considered by the Court in determining the legislation's 
history, intent and objective. Such practice has commonly been 
employed by this Court in its efforts to fulfill its judicial 
function. In Continental Telephone Company v. State Tax 
Commission, 539 P.2d 447 (1975), this Court stated: 
"Where there is doubt or uncertainty 
concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of statutes, they should be viewed in 
light of conditions and necessities which 
they are intended to meet and the objects 
sought to be obtained thereby." 
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See also Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (1975); 
Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (1974); Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 
2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966); Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 
17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966); State Land Board v. State 
Department of Fish and Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 
(1965); State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965); 
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965); Peay v. 
Board of Education of Provo City School District, 14 Utah 2d 
63, 377 P.2d 490 (1962); State v. Hunt, 13 Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d 
261 (1962); State v. Salt Lake City Public Board of Education, 
13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468 (1962); Basich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining and Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 
612 (1948); and Western Auto Transport v. Reese, 104 Utah 393, 
140 P.2d 348 (1943). 
II 
THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PROVIDE 
A STRONG MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Levels of local government have historically been the 
laboratory for political and governmental experimentation. Such 
has been the case in Utah. In spite of that opportunity for 
innovation, certain trends have surfaced. As set forth in one 
recognized treatise: 
"The disposition to increase the powers 
of the mayor and thus center the responsi-. 
bility in him has been somewhat preval7n~ in 
this country in the development o~ m~nici~al 
organization. The fundamental principle is 
that the mayor should have ample power to 
control fully the administration of all 
-5-
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municipal affairs. In addition to the veto 
power, which is his chief agency in legis-
lation, many charters give him the sole 
right to appoint and virtually unrestricted 
power to suspend or remove subordinate 
officials or heads of departments. The 
tendency seems to be not so much to increase 
the legislative power of the mayor, but to 
separate the legislative power from admin-
istrative functions, vesting the legislative 
power in a legislative department and the 
administrative functions in the executive 
branch composed of the mayor and such boards 
or departments as may be deemed advisable." 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd Ed.) Section 918. 
Such trend seems to have been exhibited in Utah. 
Prior to 1959, cities of the first and second class were under 
legislative direction to be governed by boards of commissioners 
consisting of a mayor and a stated number of commissioners. 
The powers and duties of the mayor were, for all intents, 
identical to those of the commissioners. However, the legis-
lature, in 1959, saw fit to allow cities the opportunity to 
experiment with a different form of city government, i.e., 
the Strong Mayor Form of Government. (Chapter 20, Laws of 
Utah 1959, Sections 10-6-76 et seq. repealed by Chapter 33, 
Laws of Utah 1975.) The duties of the commission and mayor 
were set forth in Section 10-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which read: 
"10-6-79. The board of commissioners 
in cities of the first and second class 
shall be the legislative bodies of such 
cities and as such shall pass ordinances, 
appropriate funds, review city administra-
tion and shall perform all duties that may 
be required of them by law. They shall 
not, however, exercise any administrative 
or governing authority conferred upon the 
mayor. The mayor of a city shall be the 
chief executive officer and shall see that 
all laws and ordinances are faithfully 
executed." 
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This language echoes effectively the separation of 
the powers of government in accord with doctrine of the French 
political philosopher Montesquieu with its accompanying scheme 
of checks and balances which has been incorporated in the 
structure of government, both federal and state. Such a dis-
tinct division and distribution of power and responsibility 
in which each officer acts to the full extent within his sphere 
is the very basis of the checks and balance theory of government. 
The trend established by the Strong Mayor Form of 
Government, supra, continued when, in 1975, the legislature 
enacted the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. 
(Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1975, Sections 10-6-103, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, et seq. repealed by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 
1977). One of those options given by said act was the council-
mayor form which provided in Section 10-6-113, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953: 
"10-6-113. The municipal council of 
a municipality adopting an optional form 
of government provided for in this act 
shall be the governing body of that munic-
ipality and shall pass ordinances, appro-
priate funds, review municipal administra-
tion, and perform all duties that may be 
required of them by law." 
As can be seen, the council's power is identical to 
that of the commission's under the Strong Mayor Form of 
Government, supra. On the other hand, the power of the mayor, 
as set forth in section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
was as follows: 
"10-6-123. In the optional form of 
government known as the council-mayor form, 
-7-
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the mayor shall be the chief executive and 
administrative officer of the municipality. 
He shall have the power and duty to: 
(1) Enforce the laws and ordinances 
of the municipality. 
(2) Execute the policies adopted by 
the council. 
(3) Appoint and remove administrative 
assistants, including a chief administra-
tive officer, as he shall deem necessary; 
with the advice and consent of the council 
appoint department heads; remove department 
heads; and appoint and remove all other 
officers, commissions, boards, and committees 
of the municipality, except as may other-
wise be specifically limited by law. 
(4) Exercise control of all depart-
ments, divisions, and bureaus within the 
municipal government. 
(5) Attend all meetings of the council 
with the right to take part in all dis-
cussions and the responsibility to inform 
the council of the condition and needs of 
the municipality and make recommendations 
and freely give advice to the council, 
except that the mayor shall not have the 
right to vote in council meetings. 
(6) Appoint a budget officer for the 
purpose of conforming with the requirements 
of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures 
Act (chapter 10 of Title 10) [section 
10-10-23 et seq.]; and in all other respects 
fulfill the requirements of that act. 
(7) With the advice and consent of 
the council appoint a qualified person to 
each of the offices in cities of recorder, 
treasurer, engineer, and attorney and, in 
towns, town treasurer and town clerk; 
create such other off ices as may be deemed 
necessary for the good government of the 
municipality, and make appointments to 
them; and regulate and prescribe the powers 
and duties of all other officers of the 
municipality, except as provided by law 
or by ordinance. 
-8-
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. (8) Furnish the municipal council 
with a.report, periodically as determined 
by ordinance, setting forth the amounts of 
all budget appropriations, the total dis-
bursements to date.from these appropriations, 
and the amount of indebtedness incurred or 
c~ntrac~ed a~ainst each appropriation 
(including disbursements and indebtedness 
incurred and not paid) and the percentage 
of the appropriations encumbered to date 
which reports shall be made available fo; 
public inspection. 
(9) .Perform s~ch other duties as may 
be pre~cribed by this act or may be required 
by ordinance not inconsistent with this act. 
Again, in 1977, the legislature ratified the strong 
mayor concept. In Section 10-3-1209, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
it provides for the adoption of a council-mayor form and states: 
"10-3-1209. The optional form of 
government known as the council-mayor form 
vests the government which adopts this 
form in two separate, independent, and 
equal branches of municipal government; 
the executive branch consisting of a mayor 
and the administrative departments and 
officers; and the legislative branch 
consisting of a municipal council ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
The functions of the municipal council are to be 
found in Section 10-3-1210, Utah Code Annotated 1953, again a 
verbatim adoption of earlier law. (See the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act and the Strong Mayor Form of Government 
Act, supra.) As with the powers and duties of the council, 
the powers of the mayor, under this most recent enactment, are 
identical with earlier law, Section 10-3-1219, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. (See Optional Forms of Municipal Government 
Act, supra.) It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature, over 
recent years, has unqualifiedly announced its intent to have a 
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strong mayor type of government available to those cities 
electing that option. It is equally clear that the strong 
mayor form envisions " ... separate, independent and equal 
branches .•. " not unlike that which operates on a federal and 
state level. 
III 
THE STRONG MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
CREATES SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT AND EQUAL 
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, EACH WITH ITS PARTICULAR 
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The separation of powers doctrine is deed-rooted in 
American governments. Historically our federal system has 
adopted this concept and the same has been applied in this 
state. In Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57 
P.l (1899), the Court reflected upon the matter and advised: 
"The powers of state government were, 
by organic law, divided into three distinct 
departments,--the legislative, executive, 
and judicial,--and no person or persons 
whose duty it is to exercise the functions 
of one department can exercise any powers 
belonging properly to either of the others, 
except in cases expressly authorized by 
the constitution. The legislative power 
was vested exclusively in the legislature, 
and it is within its sphere to make the 
laws for the government of the state. The 
power to execute the laws was referred to 
the executive department, and the power to 
declare what are the laws to the judiciary. 
The departments are all upon the same 
plane; all are co-ordinate branches of the 
same government; each absolute within its 
own sphere, except as limited or controlled 
by the constitution of this state or of 
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t~e ?nited States. The apportionment of 
~ist7nct power to one department of itself 
impl7es an inhibition against its exercise 
by either of the other departments." 
See also Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 
(1936) and Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 
117 p. 2d 298 (1941). 
Unfortunately, the doctrine is not as well documented 
in municipal government as it is in federal and state law. The 
recent change from the commission form to the mayor-council 
form obviates the need for questioning this parcity of judicial 
guidance in determining the relative parameters of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of municipal 
government. However, we are given certain guidance by the 
statutes themselves. In Section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, and its successor, Section 10-3-1219, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, we find that the mayor " ... shall be the chief executive 
and administrative officer ... ". By virtue of that declaration, 
the mayor is empowered to perform certain administrative func-
tions and these functions, in accordance with the separation of 
powers doctrine, are to be performed essentially unencumbered 
by legislative restraint. The ultimate issue of what is or is 
not an administrative function, must, of course, be determined. 
In Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939) this Court 
in citing Whitbeck v. Funk, 140 Or. 70, 12 P.2d 1020 held: 
"The general rule has been stated as 
follows: 'Acts constituting a declaration 
of public purposes and making provisions 
of ways and means of accomplishment may 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be generally classified as calling for the 
exercise of legislative power." 
The Court continued by citing Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3 
P.2d 799: 
"In determining whether the ordinance 
in question was legislative or administra-
tive we notice that the authorities in the 
books are in accord that actions which 
relate to subjects of a permanent or 
general character are considered to be 
legislative, while those which are temporary 
in operation and effect are not." 
See also 5 Utah L. R. 414 (1957). 
As can be seen from the criteria established by this 
Court, the character of the particular function must be viewed 
on an individual basis. The powers involved herein are, for 
the most part, powers of either an inherent nature or those 
flowing from those stated powers. They cannot be found absolute-
ly in the laws of this state. Amicus submits that appellant 
has fully treated the particular issues of administrative vis-
a-vis legislative prerogatives in a correct and comprehensive 
manner and accordingly appellant's Points II and IV are adopted 
by amicus as their own. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary obligation of the Court in matters of this 
nature is, whenever possible, to preserve the intent of the 
legislative enactment. The history of our governmental processes 
has been one of separation of powers, each department of govern-
ment carrying on its particular function in harmony with, but 
distinct from, each other department. This concept is the very 
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basis for the strong mayor form of government. Utah has placed 
itself in the modern flow of municipal government by permitting 
the cities to opt for a strong-mayor form. This concept has 
been continued through three different pieces of legislation. 
This optional form of municipal government inherently consists 
of an executive branch, i.e., the mayor who is also the chief 
administrative officer charged with performing those functions 
of a transitory nature. The particular issues involved herein 
are matters within the purview of the administrative department 
and accordingly are not subject to council interference. 
1978. 
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